The Supreme Court recently established a new test for determining whether law enforcement officers have interrogated a suspect in custody after he has asserted his Miranda' rights. 2 In Rhode Island v. Innis, 3 the Court held that statements which police officers knew or should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect constitute interrogation. Applying the test to the facts of the case, the majority found that police did not interrogate Innis and therefore had not violated his Miranda rights. 4 The Court's new test focuses on the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the motivations of police. 5 The new formulation has the potential for effectively protecting an individual's right to remain silent by requiring police officers to avoid topics which may evoke incriminating responses. 6 However, if courts, in applying the test, establish a low standard of care for police making statements in the presence of a suspect, the test has the potential for opening new avenues for police to design subtle methods of coercing statements from suspects. 7 Thus, the real impact of the Innis decision can be ascertained only as courts apply the test in various factual settings." The Court's conclusion that Innis was not interrogated indicates that the Court will hold police to a relatively low standard of care, which will have the effect of narrowing the scope of Miranda protections.
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THE INNIS DECISION
On January 16, 1975 , police discovered the body of a Providence, Rhode Island, cab driver who had been missing for several days after being dispatched to pick up a customer. The victim apparently had been killed by a shotgun blast fired at close range to the back of his head. Early the next morning another cab driver reported that he had been robbed by a man with a sawed-off shotgun. Several hours later, at 4:30 a.m., the police found the defendant wandering on the street unarmed.
The arresting officer read the defendant his Miranda'rights, 1 0 but did not otherwise converse with him. When other officers arrived on the scene, they told the defendant of his Miranda rights two more times, after which he asked to consult with an attorney. The police then placed the defendant in the squad car with three of the officers to be transferred to the police station. The police captain at the scene instructed the officers not to question the defendant during the trip, and the officers complied with his request. However, during conversation with his fellow officers, one officer observed that there was a school nearby for handicapped children which would be in session in the morning. Another officer responded that a helpless, handicapped little girl on the way to school might find the gun and accidentally kill herself. On hearing this, the defendant told the officers to return to the scene of the arrest so that he could lead them to the gun. After they returned to the scene, the officers informed the defendant of his Miranda rights a fourth time. The defendant then directed the officers to the shotgun.
At an evidentiary hearing before trial, the defendant sought to prevent the state from admitting the gun and his statements concerning its location. Since he had requested an attorney, the defendant argued that under Miranda the statements and the shotgun were inadmissible because police obtained them through interrogation in the absence of counsel. at 1691.
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rogation, and consequently that the evidence was not obtained in violation of Miranda, it did not decide whether the defendant had waived his rights. 3 6 Also, the Court expressly limited its holding to fifth amendment grounds. 37 Two Justices filed concurring opinions. Justice White briefly stated that he preferred to reverse on the ground that the defendant had waived his rights, but he joined the opinion of the Court.3 8 Chief Justice Burger also concurred, although he expressed concern that the tension left by the majority's decision with the Court's recent decision in Brewer would lead to uncertainty on the part of police officers. 39 Additionally, Burger feared that the new test would require officers to determine quickly the susceptibility and suggestability of a defendant in circumstances which would give even a trained psychiatrist difficulty. 4 ' Although these dissenters agreed with the Court's definition of interrogation, they felt that the Court had incorrectly applied it to the facts of this case.
42 They found it hard to imagine a stronger appeal to the suspect's conscience than stating that unless they found the gun by morning, a helpless, handicapped little girl on the way to school might find the gun and accidentally kill herself.4 The police officers made these statements in close quarters, knowing they would be overheard. Under these circumstances, Marshall and Brennan concluded that the policemen's conversation amounted to interrogation.' Justice Stevens, also dissenting, disapproved of the Court's definition of interrogation and with its application to the facts.
45 Stevens preferred to define interrogation broadly to include any statement that would normally be understood by the average listener to call for a response and any statements which police intended to elicit a response. Court's decision in Miranda marked the beginning of a new era in criminal procedure. Recognizing the inherent coerciveness of custodial surroundings, the Court held that no individual could realistically be assured his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination unless police officers explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, that he has the right to retained or appointed counsel, and that anything he says can be used as evidence against him.5 Moreover, the Court held that if a defendant indicates that he wishes to remain silent or that he wants to talk to counsel, the police must The dissent in Harris argued that the exception for impeachment testimony would effectively take away a defendant's choice to take the stand. Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The second case in the Harris line was Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) , where the defendant raped and severely beat a 43-year-old woman. Police elicited incriminating statements after warning the defendant of all of his rights except the right to appointed counsel. The Court admitted the statements for impeachment purposes and noted Miranda was only a prophylactic rule which was not synonymous with the fifth amendment.
The third case, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975) , was somewhat analogous to Innis. In Hass the defendant asked for an attorney after receiving warnings, but then proceeded to make incriminating statements before they got back to the police station to call the attorney. The statements were received under the impeachment exception.
62 Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) . In that case one officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and immediately cut off questioning when defendant indicated that he wished to remain silent. Defendant was then locked up for a period of time before a second officer came in and read defendant his rights again. This time defendant waived his rights and made incriminating statements which were admitted by the Court.
6 Oregon v. Matthiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) . In this case the defendant went to the police station voluntarily in response to a written request by a detective. The Court In reaching the conclusion that the comments of the detectives were interrogation, the Court failed to posit any definition of interrogation. The Court emphasized the fact that the detectives had designed a scheme through which they deliberately and intentionally prompted the defendant to make incriminating statements. Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.80
Thus, for the first time, the Court has defined how it will determine whether police have interrogated a suspect for purposes of Miranda.
8 l All but
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens approved of the majority's formulation of the test. 82 The
Court noted that its test "focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent .of the police."83 Consequently, if a police officer negligently makes a remark which a reasonable person would expect to elicit a response, Miranda protections would be triggered even though the officer had no intention of obtaining an admission. Conversely, Miranda may not protect a defendant where police make statements pursuant to a deliberate design to evoke a response, so long as police could not have reasonably expected to be successful. Under the Innis test, the defendant need not prove that an officer intended to elicit a response.8 4 In some instances, police motivation is difficult or impossible to determine. The new test is not concerned with police motivation except insofar as it helps to characterize the reasonable expectations of the police.85 From a policeman's point of view the test is objective. The nature of his statement, rather than his state of mind, is the crux of the test. 8 6 The test has the potential of contributing some certainty to the scope of Miranda as well as being more realistic about usual police motivations. An officer has at least some guidance in ascertaining the the right to have counsel present during interrogation to prevent him from involuntarily or unintelligently waiving his right to remain silent.9
In view of these different rationales, a suspect may be able to demonstrate that he has been interrogated under one amendment but not the other. For example, if police talk with a defendant in noncustodial surroundings, after he has been indicted, in an attempt to elicit statements from him in the absence of his counsel, the defendant's sixth amendment rights have been violated, but his fifth amendment rights do not apply. In other situations, police may talk with a suspect in custodial surroundings before any judicial proceedings have been initiated. Only the suspect's fifth amendment right would apply.
Brewer probably would have been decided the same way under the fifth amendment using the Innis test. The detectives obviously knew that the speech was likely to elicit incriminating statements from Williams.
97 However, the results may be different in those situations where police statements do not constitute interrogation under the Innis test but are made with sufficient deliberateness to constitute interrogation under the sixth amendment. Of course, any difference would be irrelevant after the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches where both rights apply, because police conduct would have to satisfy both tests. 9 s As a consequence, both police and courts may focus increased attention on the point at which sixth amendment rights become applicable if the Court's concept of interrogation becomes different under the fifth and sixth amendments in future cases. If sixth amendment rights attach when formal judicial proceedings commence, police may even delay the initiation of proceedings to avoid application of the weather, rather than matters related to the crime. Ideally, the test will cause officers to make a conscious effort to avoid any topic which may elicit an incriminating response. Conversely, the new versions of the third degree feared by Justice Stevens, if they are at all effective, will be likely to elicit incriminating responses. The fact that the defendant actually made an incriminating response will always be some evidence that the statements were likely to elicit a response. There is no reason why a difference in punctuation at the end of a sentence is relevant under the Court's new test. The Court expressly stated that interrogation includes all statements which are the functional equivalent of direct questioning.108
The opinions of ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Stevens do demonstrate that the test is susceptible to widely varying applications. It is based on behaviorial assumptions about how a normal defendant will react to certain kinds of statements. Chief Justice Burger's fears assume the average defendant is hypersensitive while Justice Marshall fears that he is rugged enough for relatively rough treatment. The effectiveness of the test in balancing the competing policies of Miranda will depend upon the assumptions made in the trial court. However, the new test is not unlike many other tests which place a heavy burden on the trial court.
One difficulty under the new test is that where the defendant is especially susceptible, he may have difficulty demonstrating that the police knew or should have known about his susceptibility. For example, a defendant who is intoxicated at the time of his arrest may have difficulty demonstrating that the officers should have been able to ascertain his drunkenness. The defendant may not know his outward appearance. Another potential difficulty with the application of the test may occur when police initiate a series of conversations with a defendant with an ultimate view toward eliciting a confession. Each individual statement may appear relatively neutral but the cumulative effect may be extremely evocative. For example, a police officer may converse with a suspect in a friendly manner in order to establish 108 Id.
109 For example, in Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1970 , the suspect made incriminating statements after being arrested which the court found were volunteered. The suspect's blood contained .21 percent alcohol after two hours in custody. The court said that the suspect was coherent during this time. If only the suspect and police are present during questioning, the suspect has a distinct disadvantage in demonstrating the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention. a relationship which will be conducive to eventual cooperation. Potentially, none of the statements would be likely to elicit a response individually.
Nonetheless, the new test has the potential to preserve the original balance between permissible and impermissible police conduct struck by Miranda. Theoretically, if courts apply it consistently, it will provide police officers with a clearly ascertainable standard of conduct. The test may require officers not only to refrain from attempting to elicit responses, but also to make an affirmative effort to avoid topics which may inadvertently elicit a response.
The test is susceptible to a wide variety of applications. Police actions and statements which may constitute interrogation arise in many situations. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the test will reach its potential. Rather, different courts will apply the test differently, and the resulting uncertainty will leave the scope of Miranda protections unclear.
n The real impact of the test will not be evident until the courts apply it. The application of the test, in turn, will depend on the behavioral assumptions of the courts about the susceptibility of most defendants to various statements. The Innis decision provides fertile ground for behavioral research. However, the first indication that courts will fail to apply the test properly is the Court's decision in Innis."' The Court set the standards for police conduct so low that police have an incentive to make suggestive comments which run contrary to the principles of Miranda.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Innis established a new test for determining whether police statements or conduct amount to interrogation under Miranda. Interrogation occurs when the police knew or should have known that their actions were likely to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant.
11 2 The test focuses on objective factors rather than police motivation. 13 However, the real meaning of the test will not be known until the lower courts begin applying the test to varying factual situations. 114 The behavioral assumptions which the lower courts make will be crucial in determining the impact of the test. 
